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Defendants.
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
REPLY TO MATTERS RAISED IN INITIAL APPEAL
POINT I
THE TEMPORARY RECEIPT BY THE LIMITED PARTNERS OF TAX
BENEFITS ASSOCIATED WITH THE ABORTIVE PURCHASE OF THE
PRESS BY THE LIMITED PARTNERS IS NOT CONSIDERATION
Continental Bank argues that because the Limited Partners
received

"substantial profit potential

and significant tax

advantages", they received their bargain for consideration for
executing the Limited Partnership Agreement.

The problem with

that response is that the Bank fails to recognize the difference between the defense of lack of consideration as opposed
to failure of consideration.
well comprise

Certainly those factors could

adequate consideration

and could be used to

defeat an argument based upon lack of consideration.
facts

in this case

are undisputed

But the

in that the Press was

delivered, assembled, and then repossessed. The Partnership
went into bankruptcy and ultimately turned the Press over to R
& P for sale indicating their intent not to consummate the
transaction.

The

entire

Agreement was destroyed.

res

of

the

Limited

Partnership

The purpose of the Partnership and

the reason the Limited Partners consented to join therein was
to acquire a very expensive printing press to operate that
press with the objective of generating sufficient revenue to
pay at least part, if not most, of the purchase price thereof.
The Limited Partners were only agreeing to put in additional
capital in the event the Partnership was unable to generate
sufficient cash flow from its printing operations to make the
monthly payments as they became due.

But when the Partnership

elected to close its doors and file for bankruptcy, and turn
its sole physical

asset back to the original

seller, the

entire purpose for the Partnership has been frustrated and
terminated.

As pointed out in the Opening Brief, additional

capital contributions required by the Limited Partners were
2

ear-marked specifically
printing press.

for the purpose of "acquiring" the

If the Partnership cannot use those funds and

"acquire" the Press, for the simple reason that the Press has
been sold to another party, it is axiomatic that the Limited
Partners cannot be compelled

to contribute money for that

contractually expressed purpose.
As to the receipt and use by the Partners of the temporary tax benefits associated with purchase of the Press by the
Partnership, the Court can take notice that under the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, §§38 and 47, the Limited Partners were
required to recapture all of the tax advantages because they
did not keep possession of the Press for the requisite period
of time and made an involuntary disposition of the Press.
POINT II
THE DETERMINATION BY THE BANKRUPTCY COURT THAT THE
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT REQUIRING ADDITIONAL
CAPITAL CONTRIBUTION WAS EXECUTORY IN NATURE IS
EITHER BINDING UNDER COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL OR
SHOULD BE GIVEN DEFERENCE BY THIS COURT.
The decision by the Bankruptcy Judge that the Limited
Partnership Agreement
either

barred

by

constituted

collateral

an executory

estoppel

or

contract is

should

be

given

considerable deference by this Court.
The Bank's response to this argument is that the apparent
ruling by the Bankruptcy Court as evidenced by the entry in
Exhibit
"perhaps

109
an

that

the Order

ill-informed

constitutes

clerk"
3

is

a

an entry made by
totally

unwarranted

supposition.

While it is acknowledged that said minute entry

is not to be given the same effect as a finding or final
judgment
maintained

entered

by

Judge

Mai,

for the purpose

such

minute

of determining

the

entries

are

reason

for

interim orders of the Court and should either be given great
deference by this Court as a determination made on an issue by
a United States District Judge having expertise in bankruptcy
matters or, alternatively, must be binding under the doctrine
of collateral estoppel.
REPLY TO MATTERS RAISED IN CROSS-APPEAL
POINT I
THE GUARANTY AGREEMENTS ARE TO
BE INTERPRETED AND ENFORCED
PURSUANT TO ILLINOIS LAW
The Guaranty

Agreements

for all Limited

Partners, as

completed, contained the following:
This guaranty has been made and delivered at
Des Plaines, Illinois and shall be governed by the
laws of the State of Illinois. (Exhibits 59 to 77)
Illinois follows a "strict construction" rule in interpreting and enforcing guaranty agreements.
It is best to begin our analysis with the rules
of construction applicable to the interpretation and
construction of guaranty agreements. It is a rule
that guaranty agreements be strictly construed in
favor of the guarantor and that a guarantor's
liability cannot be extended by construction.
(King
Korn Stamp Co. v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co. (1969) ,
114 111. App. 2d 428. 252 N.E. 2d 734 (emphasis
added))•
*

*

4

*

A guarantor is a favorite of the law and may
stand on the strict terms of his obligation when
such terms are ascertained. (Farmers State Bank v.
Doering,
80 111. App. 3d 959, 36 111. Dec. 285, 400
N.E* 2d 705, 707 (1980) (emphasis added)).
*

*

*

Looking thus at•the contract and construing the
guaranty most favorably for the guarantor, we must
agree with the plaintiff's argument. In considering
the guaranty agreement the rule is that is must be
strictly construed and the liability of a guarantor
cannot be extended by construction.
(King Korn
Stamp Co. v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co., 114 111.
App. 2d 428, 252 N.E. 2d 734, 739 (1969) (emphasis
added)).
*

*

*

As defendants contend, guaranty agreements must
be strictly construed in favor of the guarantor.
(Harris
Trust & Savings
Bank v. Stephans,
97 111.
App. 3d 683, 52 111. Dec. 927, 422 N.E. 2d 1136,
1140 (1981)).
*

*

*

It is elementary that a guarantor is not liable
for anything which he did not agree to and if the
creditor and principal have entered into an agreement materially different from that contemplated by
the instrument of guaranty, the guarantor shall be
released.
*

*

*

The promisor is properly favored to the extent
that he is permitted to stand upon the exact letter
of his bond, in the sense that no condition or
obligations may be imposed by implication, and that
no construction should be made which will hold him
liable beyond the express terms of his engagement.
(Claude So. Corp. v. Henry's Drive-In,
Inc.,
51 111.
App. 2d 289, 201 N.E. 2d 127, 132 (1964). See also,
Dee v. Bank of Oakwood Terrace,
84 111. App. 3d
1022, 406 N.E. 2d 195, 198 (1980); Lee v.
Pioneer
State Bank, 97 111. App. 3d 97, 423 N.E. 2d 218, 220
(1981); Allied
Coal and Mining Co. v. Andrews, 318
111. App. 415, 48 N.E. 2d 563, 566 (1943)).
5

The

significance

and

operative

effect of these basic

tenants of judicial conduct and construction cannot be over
emphasized.
favored

The Limited Partners stand before this Court in a

position,

specifically

for

a

position

their

created

protection

and

by

Illinois

advantage.

courts
Every

presumption of invalidity, is, therefore, in their favor, and
the Court must look at the Guaranty Agreements with the utmost
skepticism.
POINT II
THE GUARANTY AGREEMENTS WERE PREPARED BY
CONTINENTAL BANK AND ARE, THEREFORE,
CONSTRUED AGAINST ITS INTERESTS
The blank Guaranty Agreements were submitted to Color
Craft by R & P but were, in fact, prepared and approved by
Continental Bank prior to submission to the Limited Partners.
(Transcript, Vol. II, pp. 244-245)
As author of the printed text of the Guaranty Agreement,
the text is construed most strongly against
the Bank.
First, the guaranty forms here were prepared
and submitted by the plaintiff [bank].
Thus, we
should construe the agreement in favor of the
guarantor and not extend the guarantor's liability
by construction. (Farmers State Bank v. Doerinq,
80
111. App. 3d 959, 36 111. Dec. 285, (1980)).
*

*

*

In these transactions it is generally the
lender who prepares the instrument, and its provisions are, in accordance with the established rule,
construed most strongly against it.
(Fannin
State
Bank v. Grossman, 30 111. App. 2d 484, 175 N.E. 2d
268, 270 (1961) (emphasis added)).
*

*

6

*

Again, the form used for the guaranty of June 4
was a printed form prepared by defendants and will,
therefore, in case of ambiguity, be construed
against defendants and in favor of plaintiff.
(Kesner v. Farroll,
268 111. App. 531, 540 (1932)).
POINT III
THE COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT THE FAILURE OF ALL LIMITED
PARTNERS TO SIGN GUARANTY AGREEMENTS, A REQUIREMENT IMPOSED
BY R & P AND THE BANK, WAS A CONDITION PRECEDENT WHICH
COULD NOT BE WAIVED AND BARS ENFORCEMENT OF THE GUARANTIES
The Trial Court's findings on this issue are unequivocal
and are amply supported in both fact and law.

All of the

Limited Partners must sign pro-rata personal guaranties.

It

was an absolute '"requirement" upon which the "whole transaction was predicated".

(R. 2412, Findings of Fact, Par. 8;;

Exhibit 106, p. 2, Par. 5, 2nd sentence; Trans. Vol. II, pp.
353, 351-52, 382; R. 2421, Conclusions of Law, Pars. 3-4)
The Illinois law relative to this issue is clear and
concise.

It has not changed in the century following its

announcement in Belleville

Savings

Bank v. Bornman,

124 111.

200, 16 N.E. 210 (1888), a decision cited and followed in the
recent and controlling decision by the Illinois Supreme Court
in State

Bank of East

Moline

v. Cirivello,

74 111. 2d 426, 24

111. Dec. 839, 386 N.E. 2d 43 (1978).
In Cirivello

the Court addressed two issues:

Disposition of this cause requires us to
resolve the following two questions:
(1) Was the
guaranty agreement conditioned upon the signatures
of all 13 limited partners? and (2) If the guaranty
was conditional, could the bank waive the condition
by advancing the loan? (Jdf., at 45).
7

The salient facts in Cirivello

are so identical with the

case at bar as to appear hand tailored specifically for the
purpose of disposing of this case.

They are as follows:

1.
A limited partnership existed comprised of
13 limited partners. {Id.,
at 44).
2.
The limited partnership negotiated a loan
from the State Bank of East Moline in the amount of
$65#000. (Jd., at 44).
3.
The Bank told one of the partners (Cook)
that all the limited partners would have to sign a
personal guaranty before the loan would be advanced.
(Jd., at 44).
4.
The Bank supplied the printed guaranty
forms to be signed by all the limited partners.
(Jd., at 44).
5.
The limited partners were told by one of
the other limited partners of the Bank's condition
that all limited partners sign personal guaranties.
(Jd., at 45).
6.
One of the 13 limited partners failed or
refused to sign the guaranty forms. (Jd., at 45).
7.
When the guaranties from the 12 who did
sign were received, the Bank noted there was "one
more to come." (Jd., at 45).
8.
The Bank received financial statements on
all 13 limited partners. (Jd., at 45).
9.
The Bank never obtained the 13th signature
on the guaranty and never informed the 12 who signed
that one of their group had not signed.
(Jd., at
45) .
10. The written guaranty form did not state on
its face any condition that all limited partners
must sign to be enforceable. (Jd., at 45).
11. The Court ruled the parol evidence rule
did not bar extrinsic evidence to show the incompleteness of the guaranties and failure of a
condition precedent to the enforceability therein.
(Jd., at 46, citing Belleville,
supra, United
States

a

v. Everett
Monte Cristo
Hotel,
Inc.,
524 F.2d 127,
130 (9th Cir0 1975); 4 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, Sec.
634 (3d Ed. 1961)).
On those facts, the trial court ruled that the Guaranty
Agreements were unenforceable and gave judgment to the limited
partners.

The Bank appealed and the Appellate Court in a 2 to

1 decision reversed
notice, prior

to

holding that the Bank did not have actual
granting

the

loan,

of and from the limited

partners that each limited partner was intending to impose a
condition to enforceability that all of the limited partners
sign a personal guaranty of the indebtedness.
In this case, the record fails to show indication of any condition as to the defendants' guaranties to the plaintiff bank.
(State
Bank of East
Moline v. Cirivello,
56 111. App. 3d 269, 273 (App.
Ct. 1978)).
Moreover, the Appellate Court held that since it was the
Bank

who

had

imposed

the

condition

that

all

13

limited

partners sign personal guaranties, the Bank could waive the
condition if it wanted:
While [the Bank] had stated that all limited
partners would be required to sign the guaranty, it
clearly waived this requirement and made the loan on
the basis of the 12 guaranties.
(Id.)
Justice Barry dissented, noting:
The evidence is not disputed that the plaintiff
bank required all 13 limited partners as guarantors
to this loan transaction and so communicated this
requirement to the partnership and all the partners.
It seems to me to be a meaningless task to
require the guarantor to notify the plaintiff bank
of the condition of the guaranty which was
required
by the plaintiff
in the first
place.
It is undisputed that the bank intended, at least initially,
9

for all 13 limited partners to be bound as guarantors of the loan and that plaintiff, therefore, had
actual knowledge of this condition. The evidence in
the record also readily supports a conclusion that
the 12 defendants who signed as guarantors intended
the condition to be operative when they executed the
agreement.
The majority opinion would allow the plaintiff
to unilaterally rescind the operation of the
condition of all 13 limited partners signing as
guarantors, and thereby unilaterally change the
obligations of the contract contrary to the intention of the parties at the inception of their
contract. The evidence of the parties' intention in
entering into the contract is at odds with the
result reached in the majority opinion and I,
therefore, respectfully dissent.
(Id.,
at 275-76;
dissenting
opinion)
(emphasis added).
On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court adopted, unanimously, the dissent of Justice Barry, reversing
Court,

and

partners.

reinstating

the

dismissal

of

all

the Appellate
the

limited

In doing so, it clearly articulated the controlling

law in this case.

As to the issue of whether the limited

partners need expressly inform the Bank of the condition that
all limited partners sign, the Court held:
The bank contends that there is no evidence
whatsoever that defendants imposed a condition on
the guaranty or that they communicated any condition
to the bank.
Our examination of the record dis-

closes that this

is true,

but beside

the point.

The

basis of the trial court's finding was that the
bank, through the representations of its president,
premised the guaranty upon the condition that all 13
limited partners sign and that the defendants
accepted these terms by signing the guaranty forms
and delivering the forms to the bank. If there is
sufficient factual support for the trial court to
have drawn this conclusion, certainly the law does
not require that the defendants reiterate the
condition to the bank. (386 N.E. 2d at 46) (emphasis added)•
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As to the issue of whether the Bank, as author of the
condition that all limited partners sign, could unilaterally
waive the condition, the Court held:
Having affirmed the factual finding that the
guaranty was conditional, we must address whether
the bank could waive the condition by advancing the
loan. We hold that it may not. As we have already
stated, the condition, though initiated by the bank,
contemplated that the guaranty would not become
operative unless all 13 limited partners agreed to
stand behind the loan.
By issuing the loan, the
bank materially increased the proportionate liability of those who had signed. In addition, failure
to secure James Patten as a co-signed guarantor
deprived the defendants of their equitable right of
contribution against him.
(See Weger v. Robinson
Nash Motor Co. (1930), 340 111. 81, 94, 175 N.E. 7;
20 111. L. & Prac. Guaranty sec. 102 (1956)). When
the bank's demand that all 13 limited partners
guaranty the loan became a condition to the liability of those who signed the guaranty, it could not
be unilaterally waived by the bank.
(Td., at 4647).
Cirivello

is the most recent and concise pronouncement of

Illinois law on this subject and is dispositive of all the
claims herein based upon the written Guaranty Agreements.
Cirivello

involved

limited

partners

who

were

signing

joint and several guaranties for 100% of the total indebtedness of $65,000.

Under the principal of equitable contribu-

tion among partners, the 12 who signed, by virtue of the
Bank's failure to obtain one more signature, had an increase
in their net liability from l/13th of $65,000 or $5,000 to
l/12th of $65,000 or $5,416.66, or a net

increase

In

partners who

the

case

at

bar,

the

21 limited

of $416.66.
signed

Guaranty Agreements represented 19 1/2 of 28 total Class "&"

11

partnership units.
the remaining

By the Bank not obtaining signatures from

10 limited partners owning 8 1/2 units, the

consequence is even more pronounced and detrimental to the
Color Craft partners than the Cirivello
Limited

Partners

(28 Units)

signed

partners.
guaranties,

If all 31
their

net

liability, assuming equal contribution by all limited partners
would be: , 28

$6,221,258.20 = $222,187.79 each.

But, if

only 21 Limited Partners (19.5 Units) were obligated the net
liability would be:

19.5

$6,221,258.20 = $319,038.88 each,

or a net increase per partnership unit of $96.851.091
If there was ever any doubt as to the applicability of
Cirivello

to

cases,

like that

at bar, where the

Limited

Partners were guarantying only a pro-rata share of the total
indebtedness, the doubt was removed by the Illinois Appellate
Courts in applying the Cirivello
In Mount Prospect

tors.
Sawmill,

State

doctrine to pro-rata guaranBank v. Forestry

Recycling

93 111. App. 3d 448, 48 111. Dec. 889, 417 N.E. 2d

621 (App. Ct. 1981) a limited partnership borrowed $343,740.00
with the Bank imposing a condition of personal guaranties by
all limited partners, but the guaranties were pro rata
for the full amount of the loan:
Limited Partner

Maximum Liability

Neiman
Thomas
Abrams
Collins
Laker

$19,000
38,000
76,000
38,000
19,000
$190,000

(417 N.E. 2d at 624)
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and not

Both the Bank and the Limited Partners, however, understood there would be 19, Limited Partners and that all Limited
Partners would sign Guaranty Agreements.
As part of the inducement to become limited
partners and guarantors of the loan to be made by
Bank, they were told by Goldstein that there would
be 25 limited partnership units to be purchased by
19 limited partners, each of whom would become coguarantors on the loan.
Goldstein showed them a
list of the 19 limited partners, which list indicated the amounts to be invested by each limited
partner. (Id., at 625).
In

reversing

a

Summary

Judgment

against

the

Limited

Partners who had signed guaranties, the Court held:
A contract of guaranty may be conditional on
others becoming co-guarantors and the contract is
unenforceable if this condition is not met.
(State
Bank of East Moline v. Cirivello
(1978), 74 111. 2d
426, 24 111. Dec. 839, 386 N.E. 2d 43;
Belleville
Savings
Bank v. Bornman (1888), 124 111. 200, 16
N.E. 210.) Also, the parol evidence rule does not
bar the use of extrinsic evidence to establish that
this condition existed.
(State Bank of East
Moline
v. Cirivello
(1978), 74 111. 2d 426, 24 111. Dec.
8398, 386 N.E. 2d 43.) Although this condition is
usually one imposed by the guarantors, either the
creditor or guarantor may premise the guaranty on
this condition, and if the condition is known and
agreed upon by the parties, it becomes a part of the
guaranty. (State
Bank of East Moline v.
Cirivello
(1978), 74 111. 2d 426, 24 111. Dec. 839, 386 N.E.2d
43; see United States
v. Everett
Monte Cristo
Hotel,
Inc.
(9th Cir. 1975), 524 F.2d 127.) Additionally,
if a bank conditions the making of a loan on the
receipt of contracts of guaranty from several
persons and the bank makes known this condition to
the potential guarantors, who enter into their
contracts of guaranty in reasonable reliance on the
bank's representation, the condition becomes a part
of the contracts of guaranty even though the loan
agreement and guaranty agreements are different
contracts and even though the guarantors fail to
communicate to the bank that they agreed to the
condition or insisted upon it. See State
Bank of
13

East Moline v. Cirivello
(1978), 74 111. 2d 426, 24
111. Dec. 839, 386 N.E. 2d 43.
In the present case, we believe a genuine issue
of material fact exists as to whether a condition to
the contracts of guaranty was that all the limited
partners become co-guarantors.
There is also a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether this
condition was met. (Id.,
at 628-29).
Illinois, on this point,

stands

four-square with the

general principles of law adopted by a majority of jurisdictions and leading treatise on the subject:
Where the surety signs an instrument by which
his obligation is in terms conditional upon another's signing the same instrument as principal or
as cosurety, the surety is not bound unless the
other signs the instrument.
(Restatement of Law
"Surety", §101(1)).
*

*

*

Where a guarantor delivers a guaranty subject
to the condition precedent that others will also
guaranty the debt, he is not liable unless the other
guarantors do sign.
(L. Simpson, SURETYSHIP §53
(1950); J. Elder, STEARNS ON SURETYSHIP §7.10 (5th
ed. 1951), cited and followed in United States
v.
Everett
Monte Cristo
Hotel,
524 F.2d 127, 130 (9th
Cir. 1975)).
*

*

*

A conditional guaranty contemplates, as a
condition to liability on the part of the guarantor,
the happening of some contingent event (other that
the default of the principal debtor, or the performance of some act on the part of the creditor. In its
inception, the promise of the guarantor is nothing
more than an offer for a bilateral or a unilateral
contract.
Thus, the guarantor may condition the
acceptance or the enforceability of his offer of
guaranty on the occurrence (or the non-occurrence)
of any fact or event, and the occurrence (or the
non-occurrence) of that fact or event is a necessary
condition precedent to liability under the guaranty.
The obligation of the guarantor will not be enforced
unless the specific fact or event has occurred (or
14

failed to occur) .
p. 1020-21 (1968)).

(38 Am. Jur. 2d, "GUARANTY" §21
POINT IV

THERE WAS NEVER A MEETING OF THE MINDS AS TO THE SALIENT
TERMS AND PROVISIONS OF THE GUARANTY AGREEMENTS
ALLOWING REFORMATION OF THE GUARANTY AGREEMENTS
Again, the Trial Court's specific findings on this issue
are amply supported in law and fact.
"amount" to be guarantied

The Court found that the

"was always communicated

to and

understood by the Limited Partners to be in the range of
$3,000,000."

(R. 2414, Findings of Fact, Par. 11; Exhibit 12:

Exhibit 32; Exhibit 36)

The partnerships prior experience and

practice was to have partners guaranty only the principal of
acquisition indebtedness.
II, p. 238,309)

(Id., Exhibits 4, 5, 6; Trans. Vol.

But, the parties never discussed nor agreed

upon a figure; nor could the figure be calculated from the
written and signed documents. (R. 2416-2419; Findings of Fact,
Pars. 15-21)
There is no question that under the proper facts and
circumstances there lies within the Courts equity jurisdiction
the power to reform written agreements, but invocation of that
power must always be undertaken with

extreme

after the Court is convinced by the quantum

caution

and only

and quality

evidence to change the written document.
Courts of equity, in the exercise of their
jurisdiction to reform written instruments, must
proceed
with the utmost
caution.
. .
While the
remedy is well recognized, it is not to be administered arbitrarily, and the right to have a court of
equity decree the reformation of a written instru15

of

ment is not absolute. (66 Am. Jur. 2d §3 "Reformation of Instruments", p. 528) (citations omitted).
Accordingly, courts of equity act sparingly in
the reformation of written instruments. . .
(Id.,
at 528).
Reformation is a remedy not easily won.
(Nat'2. Union Fire Ins. Co. v. D & L Const. Co., 353
F.2d 169 (CA 8 1965), cert,
den.,
384 U.S. 941, 16
L.Ed 2d 539, 86 S.Ct. 1462).
In an action for reformation, much stronger and
clearer evidence is required than in an ordinary
action for damages. The high remedy of reformation
is never granted on a probability, or a mere
preponderance of evidence. The strict requirements
relate not only to the mistake and the mutuality
thereof . . . but also to the real agreement which
is alleged to have been made.
*

*

*

. . . It is frequently laid down, for example,
that the proof must be clear and convincing, or
clear and satisfactory, or clear, satisfactory and
convincing, and to these requirements some courts
have added other expressions, such as that the proof
must be strong, cogent, specific, exact, precise,
unequivocal, indubitable, and decisive. Still other
expressions are that the proof must establish the
facts to a moral certainty; must take the question
out of the range of reasonable controversy; and must
be so clear as to establish the fact beyond cavil.
(66 Am. Jur. 2d §123 "Reformation of Instruments" p.
647-649) (footnotes omitted).
Under Illinois law the proof of the mutual mistake must
be by more than a mere preponderance of the evidence.

It must

be proven by "very strong, clear and convincing evidence"
which leaves "no reasonable doubt."
In a reformation suit, the plaintiff has a higher
burden of proof than in an ordinary civil litigation, and must prove a case by very strong,
clear
and convincing
evidence." (319 South La Salle
Corp.
V. Lopin, 19 111. App. 3d 285, 311 N.E. 2d 288, 291
(1974) citing
State
Farm Mutual Auto Ins.
Co. v.
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Hanson, 1 111. App. 3d 678, 288 N.E. 2d 523 (1972);
followed
in B. L. Kelley v. Riverside
Boulevard
Ind.
Church of God, 44 111. App. 3d 673, 3 111. Dec. 298,
358 N.E. 2d 696, 707 (1976)).
[T]he evidence must leave no reasonable doubt as to
the mutual intention of the parties. . .
(Kolkovich
v. Tosolin,
19 111. App. 3d 524, 311 N.E. 2d 782,
786 (1974)).
More importantly,

in reforming

the contract the Court

cannot and must not become involved in adding

to the agreement

terms and provisions to which the parties had never agreed.
Courts should proceed with great caution in reforming written instruments. (Booth v. Cole Corp.,
121
111. App. 2d 77, 257 N.E.2d 265 (1970)). The court
may not make a new agreement for the parties under
color of reforming the one made by them, nor can it
add a provision
which the parties
never agree
upon.
(Kolkovich
Vc Tosolin,
19 111. App. 3d 524, 311 N.E.
2d 782, 786 (1974)) (emphasis added).
*

*

*

But it is not the province of courts to interpolate
new terms into contracts against the evident
intentions of the parties.
(Castle
v. Powell,
261
111. App. 132, 141 (1931), citing,
Robinson v. Stow,
39 111. 568, 572 (1864)).
The party seeking reformation must
parties knew,

understood,

and agreed

establish that the

upon all

the

essential

terms sought to be "reformed" into the agreement.
Inasmuch as the relief sought in reforming a
written instrument is to make it conform to the real
agreement or intention of the parties, a
definite
intention or agreement
on which the minds of
the
parties
had met must have pre-existed the instrument
in question.
(66 Am. Jur. 2d §4 "Reformation of
Instruments," p. 529) (emphasis added).
*

*

*

The purpose of reformation is to effectuate the
common intention of both parties which was incor17

rectly reduced to writing. To obtain the benefit of
this statute, it is necessary that the parties shall
have had a complete mutual understanding of all the
essential terms of their bargain; if no agreement
was reached, there would be no standard to which the
writing could be reformed.
(McConnel v.
Pickering
Lumber Corp.,
217 F.2d 44, 49 (9th Cir. 1954)
citing,
Bailard
v. Harden, 36 Cal.2d 703, 227 P.2d
10 (1951)).
*

*

*

There can be no reformation unless there is a
preliminary or prior agreement, either written or
verbal, between the parties. . . there must have
been an understanding between the parties on all
essential
terms,
otherwise there would be no
standard to which the writing can be reformed. (66
Am. Jur. 2d §4 "Reformation of Instruments," p. 529)
(emphasis added).
*

*

*

Both parties must have understood the contract
as it ought to have been and in fact was, except for
the mistake.
(66 Am. Jur. 2d §4 "Reformation of
Instruments," p. 529).
*

Although a court
instrument to make it
it has no power to
parties, whether the

teral.

(Lemoge Electric

*

*

of equity may revise a written
conform to the real agreement,
make a new contract for the
mistake be mutual or unila-

v. County of San Mateo, 297

P.2d 638, 641 (Cal. 1956); see also,
Burt v. Los
Angeles Olive Growers Ass'n.,
175 Cal. 668, 674-675,
166 P. 993 (1917) ; 5 Williston on Contracts (Rev.
Ed. 1937), §1549, pp. 4344-4345; Rest., Contracts,
§504, Comment c ) .
*

*

*

If no prior agreement or intention existed,
then the only remedy is rescission; and if a case
for rescission cannot be made out and a prior
existing agreement or intention differing from the
instrument before the court cannot be proved, then
the instrument must stand as made. (66 Am. Jur. 2d
§4 "Reformation of Instruments," p. 530).
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*

*

*

The court cannot rewrite the contract which the
parties have made so as to express an agreement
which they did not enter into. A court has no power
to supply an agreement which was never made. . . A
court should not, under the guise of reformation,
write into a written agreement a term or provision
which was not earlier agreed to by the parties
themselves.
(66 Am. Jur. 2d §5 "Reformation of
Instruments," pp. 530-532).
One may not employ a suit for reformation of a
contract for the purpose of making an entirely new
agreement.
Such suits are only to establish and
perpetuate an already existing contract, and to make
it express the real intent of the parties as such
intent existed at the time of the making of the
agreement. A court of equity is not empowered to
supply be decree an agreement which was never made.
It is not empowered to amend and alter a contract .
. . by inserting therein words, terms or conditions
on which there was never a meeting of the minds. It
is the duty of the courts to enforce contracts which
the parties themselves have made and not to make new
and different contracts for the parties or to make
significant additions thereto and thus give to one
or more parties, benefits and advantages on which
the minds of the contracting parties have never met.
(Sullivan
v. Marsh,
225 P. 2d 872 at 872 (Mont.
1950)).
A mere mistake
permit reformation.

in the agreement, if unilateral, will not
The mistake must be mutual

and common to

both parties as well as the existence of other terms
agreed

upon.

mutually

Unless both the mistake and the omitted agree-

ment are common to both contracting parties, established by
clear and convincing evidence, reformation will not lie.
To reform an instrument upon the ground of
mistake, the mistake must be of fact and not of law,
mutual and common to both parties . . . (Kelley
v.
Riverside
Blvd. Ind. Church of God, 44 111. App. 3d
673, 3 111. Dec. 298, 358 N.E. 2d 696, 707 (1976),
citing,
Ambarann Corp. v. Old Ben Coal Corp.,
395
111. 154, 166, 69 N.E. 2d 835, 841 (1946)).
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A "mutual mistake" is one common to both
contracting parties, wherein each labors under the
same misconception. Thus when there is a mutual
mistake the parties are in actual agreement, but the
agreement in its written form does not express the
parties' real interest. (See, Black's Law Dictionary (5th Ed. 1979), p. 920).
A mutual mistake, for which an instrument will
be reformed, is one which is reciprocal and common
to both parties, each alike laboring under the same
misconception in respect to the terms of the written
instrument. It is a mistake shared by both parties
to the instrument at the time of reducing their
agreement to writing, and the mistake is mutual if
the contract has been written in terms which violate
the understanding of both parties—that is, if it
appears both have done what neither intended. * *
* The mistake cannot be mutual if the minds of the
parties did not meet in a common intent.
(66 Am.
Jur. 2d §23 "Reformation of Instruments" p. 551)
(citations omitted).
Indeed, when the right to reform an instrument
is based solely on a mistake, it is necessary that
the mistake be mutual, and that both parties
understood the contract as the complaint alleges it
ought to have been, and as in fact it was except for
the mistake. . . An instrument cannot be reformed
where the minds of the parties did not meet in a
pre-existing agreement.
(66 Am. Jur. 2d §22
"Reformation of Instruments" p. 550-51).
Not only have the Plaintiffs not been able to establish
by "clear and convincing evidence" the mutual agreement

of the

parties as to the omitted terms, the evidence shows

convinc-

ingly,

even

discussion
the same.

uncontrovertedly,

that

not

even

knowledge

or

of those terms occurred, let alone acquiescence in
For that reason the equity jurisdiction ought not

to permit reformation, or more accurately, "formation" of an
agreement the parties never made!
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It is elementary and basic "black-letter" law that before
any enforceable agreement comes into existence, the parties
must have come to a "meeting of the minds" on all

essential

portions or terms of the contract.
The principle is fundamental that a party
cannot be held to have contracted if there was no
assent, and this is so both as to express contracts
and contracts implied in fact. There must be mutual
assent or a meeting of the minds on all essential
elements or terms in order to form a binding
contract. (17 Am. Jur. 2d "Contracts" §18 p. 354).
This case is entirely devoid of any evidence which would
suggest that the parties ever agreed upon the amount of the
indebtedness being guarantied.

The amount being guarantied is

a term so fundamental to the contract that the absence of
evidence of assent to a specified amount or formula renders a
Guaranty Agreement which does not contain such a provision
absolutely void and unenforceable.
POINT V
THE GUARANTY AGREEMENTS WERE EITHER NOT VALIDLY ASSIGNED
BY R & P TO CONTINENTAL BANK, OR, IF ASSIGNED, BECAME
UNENFORCEABLE BECAUSE THE ASSIGNMENT CHANGED
THE NATURE OF THE GUARANTIES
On October Z,

1980, Color Craft, Moxley, OfMara, and

Cullimore signed and created the following instruments:
1.

A MACHINERY CONTRACT with attached Exhibits A - E
thereof (Exhibit 42).

2.

Three Promissory Notes (Exhibits 43, 44, 45).

3.

Nine Guaranty Agreements (Exhibits
attachments; Exhibits 47, 48, 49).
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43,

44,

45

Then,

on October

8., 1980, R

& P executed

a

"SELLER'S

ASSIGNMENT" which specifically enumerated documents or rights
assigned by R & P to Continental Bank:
FOR VALUE RECEIVED • • . the undersigned
(Roberts
& Porter) hereby sells, assigns and
transfers to CINB all rights, title and interest of
the undersigned in and to:
(i) the installments payable under the .
. . Conditional Sale Contract dated October 7,
1980 . . . between the undersigned and Color
Craft . . . , and
(ii) all of the rights of the undersigned
under said Contract.
*

*

*

• . . all right, title and interest
undersigned in and to
(A) the property [Presses], . . .
(B) all replacements . . . ,
(C)

all proceeds . . .

(SELLERfS ASSIGNMENT, October 8, 1980
At

the

time

of the

of

this

"assignment"

Partner Guaranty Agreements existed.

Exhibit 52).

none of the

Limited

Nor, although specifi-

cally mentioning other assigned documents, does the "assignment" refer to or even purport to "assign" any rights of R & P
in the Guaranty Agreements.
Even if said assignment is held to pass to Continental
Bank rights against the Limited Partners by implication, the
assignment

of the Machinery Contract materially changed the

nature of the obligations and rights of Color Craft and its
Limited Partners thereby voiding said assignment.
In February

1983, the Limited Partners filed an action

against R & P alleging, inter

alia,
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the existence of numerous

defects in the Nebiolo Press which allegedly resulted in a
breach of the MACHINERY CONTRACT, or, alternatively R & P was
in default thereof, relieving the Partnership of the obligation to complete the purchase of the press.

(Complaint,

February, 1983 Exhibit 104).
Said action was automatically stayed against R & P by
virtue of the filing by R & P of voluntary Bankruptcy, but the
chose-in action was later purchased by Continental Bank at an
auction held in the Bankruptcy Court.

(Exhibits 105, 108)

After Continental Bank, as alleged assignee, filed this
action the Limited Partners filed a Counter Claim alleging the
same defects and claims asserted in the action against R & P
as

a

defense

to the

obligation

(Counterclaim filed herein).

to pay

Continental

Bank.

On Motion of Continental Bank

the Trial Court granted Summary Judgment dismissing, no cause
of

action,

said

Counterclaim

on the grounds

and

for the

reasons that Continental Bank was insulated from said claims
by virtue of its status as an "assignee" of R & P and the
operative effect of the following provision of the MACHINERY
CONTRACT:
SECURITY INTEREST . . .
(c) Purchaser agrees not to assert against an
assignee of Seller any claim
or defense
which
purchaser may assert against Seller.
(emphasis
added) (MACHINERY CONTRACT, page 2 Exhibit 42).
The "assignment" to Continental Bank does not, therefore,
create a cause of action for two reasons.
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First, the pur-

ported

"ASSIGNMENT"

does not

recite that

it

includes the

Guaranty Agreements, nor could it do so, since the assignment
by R & P to Continental Bank occurred on October 8,
weeks before

1980,

the Guaranty Agreements of Limited Partners ever

came into existence.

Second, such after-acquired rights by R

& P are not covered by the SELLER'S ASSIGNMENT and are nonassignable.
As a general rule, in order to be assignable,
an estate or interest in property must have an
actual or potential existence and be in the actual
or potential possession of the assignor at the time
of the assignment.
Rights growing out of circumstances which do not yet exist are not assignable,
even for value, for there is no subject matter on
which to operate. An assignment of a thing not in
existence gives only an equitable right.
(6A
C.J.S., "ASSIGNMENTS", §14, page 605-606).
Under Illinois law guaranties are generally not assignable at alll
The general rule in Illinois is that guaranties
are non-assignable. (Second National
Bank of
Peoria
v. Diefendorf
(1878), 90 111. 396.)
This rule,
however, is not applied automatically rather the
courts will examine the facts of each case to
determine whether the policy underlying the rule is
applicable.
The rule is a corollary of general
contract principles that a party may be held only to
the precise obligation which it undertook.
(Shranz
v. Grossman, 90 111. App. 3d 507, 45 111. Dec. 654,
412 N.E.2d 1378, 1384 (1980)).
More significant, under Illinois law, where some material
alteration is made in the liability of the guarantor, any
assignment of such a guaranty renders the guaranty void.
This rule was first adopted by the Illinois Supreme court
in Second

National

Bank of Peoria
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v.

Diefendorf,

90 111. 396,

407 (1878) and recognized, in spite of, or perhaps because of,
its antiquity, in Harris

Trust

and Savings

Bank v.

Stephans,

97 111. App. 3d 683, 52 111- Dec. 927, 422 N.E. 2d 1136
(1981).

The rule, as articulated by

the Illinois Supreme

Court is as follows:
Illinois recognized the general principal of
non-assignability of guaranties for which defendants
contend . . . that rule is not applied mechanically,
however; the facts of each case determine whether
the policy underlying the rule applies. Thus, the
guarantor is not released unless the "* * * essentials of the original contract have * * * been
changed and the performance required of the principal is * * * materially different from that first
contemplated.
*

*

*

Furthermore, under the present law the test of
whether a guaranty may be transferred is not whether
new credit is extended after the transfer, but
whether
the
obligations
of the parties
to
the
guaranty have thereby changed.
(422 N.E. 2d 1139).
In the case at bar, the effect of the assignment from R &
P to Continental Bank was to change the nature of the contract
being personally guarantied
sible"

to

"unconditional"

from "conditional" and "defenand

"indefensible."

This

was

accomplished by virtue of the afore-described written provision of the MACHINERY CONTRACT waiving all defenses against
assignees which could have been asserted against the assignor.
The

GUARANTY

AGREEMENTS

are,

therefore,

"materially

altered" by virtue of the assignment and the assignment is not
the mere changing of named "payees" which permitted continuing
enforceability in Illinois under the Harris
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rule.

Since the

assignment

would

Partnership,

materially

and,

alter

ultimately

the

the

liability

Limited

of

the

Partners,

the

assignment is void and Continental Bank has no standing to sue
in this matter.
POINT VI
THE CONTRACT PROVIDED FOR SIGNED DOCUMENTS EVIDENCING PERSONAL
GUARANTIES AND RELIANCE ON THE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT PROVIDING THE OBLIGATION TO SIGN WAS INSUFFICIENT
AND UNACCEPTABLE TO R & P OR THE BANK
The Bank argues that if it does not have enforceable
agreements

with

the

Limited

Partners,

the

Court

should

construe the Limited Partnership Agreement as either compelling

the

Partners'

signatures

thereon,

or

accepting

the

obligation to sign as sufficient in itself to create liability.
where

While that doctrine may be invoked in circumstances
there

is no

question

as to the

salient

terms and

provisions of the Guaranty Agreement, e.g., Lawndale

Steel

V.

(3d Dist.

Appel,

98 111. App. 3d 167, 423 N.E. 2d 957

Co.

1981), it is restricted to cases where specific performance is
not prohibited because of the uncertainty of the agreed-upon
terms and provisions.
Furthermore, the Bank now asks this Court to give it what
it refused to accept in the contract formation.

The testimony

is clear that the Bank refused to accept the internal partnership promise to guaranty, rather, insisting on signed documents instead.

(Trans. Vol. II, pp. 383-84)
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Under both Illinois and/or Utah law, liability based upon
an obligation to pay a debt owed by another is governed by the
Statute of Frauds and clearly bars recovery against the nonsigning Limited Partners as a matter of law:
Illinois
No action shall be brought, whereby to charge .
. . the defendant upon any special promise to answer
for the debt, default or miscarriage of another
person, . . . unless the promise or agreement upon
which such action shall be brought, or some memorandum or note thereof, shall be in writing, and signed
by the party to be charged therewith, or some other
person thereunto by him lawfully authorized. (ILL.
REV. STAT. Ch. 59, §1) .
Utah
In the following cases every agreement shall be
void unless such agreement, or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party
to be charged therewith:
*

*

*

(2) Every promise to answer for the
debt, default or miscarriage of another.
UTAH CODE ANN. §25-5-4(2)
Although the evidence tacitly indicates that the nonsignors "intended" to execute a Guaranty Agreement if properly
filled out, the fact remains that the ultimate intention never
came to fruition by obtaining the signatures of said Limited
Partners.

Such a void cannot, moreover, be remedied by a suit

in equity for "reformation" to compel, in fact or by operation
of law, the Limited Partner's signature.
In accordance with the rule that a court of
equity will not and cannot reform an invalid or void
instrument, a court of equity has no power, under
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the pretense of reformation, so to construct or
reconstruct a contract as to make a complete
contract out of one which, on its face, was incomplete or insufficient to meet the requirements of
the statute of frauds, and this is true irrespective
of any intention of the parties to conform to the
requirements of the statute, and of the fact that
their failure to do so arose from mistake or
ignorance.
So too, and although there is some
authority to the contrary, it is generally held that
where a memorandum is insufficient to meet the
requirements of the statute of frauds, the memorandum may not be reformed, on the ground that to do so
would be to nullify the statute.
* * * A contract signed by one party only,
and void for lack of consideration, will not be
reformed in equity so as to embody the terms of a
prior oral contract void under the statute of
frauds. Likewise, a court of equity cannot supply a
signature of a party . . .
(66 Am. Jur. 2d §38
"Reformation of Instruments" pp. 562-63).
POINT VII
IF, AS THE BANK ARGUES, CULLIMORE IS PERSONALLY LIABLE ON
THE NOTES, THE NOTES DO NOT CONSTITUTE A PARTNERSHIP DEBT
WHICH LIMITED PARTNERS WOULD BE LIABLE FOR EITHER
UNDER PERSONAL GUARANTY AGREEMENTS OR THE
PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT
The evidence is clear that the blank guaranty forms and
the "contract" to be guarantied therein referred to the three
separate

promissory

notes

signed

by

Moxley,

O'Mara,

and

Cullimore (Exhibits 43, 44 and 45; trans. Vol II, pp.250-51;
pp. 341-379) Moxley, O'Mara, and Cullimore each signed one
guaranty form for each note.

The same form was used with the

Limited Partners only now the Bank wants the singular word
"contract" within the text of the Guaranty Agreements to be
interpreted as all three notes; the inconsistency is apparent.
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Furthermore,

if, as the

Bank argues, the

failure of

Cullimore to designate by his signature his representative
capacity causes the notes to be his personal obligations (he
not being a general partner of Color Craft) then the Limited
Partners

are

not

responsible

for

guarantying

Cullimore's

personal debts.
SUMMARY
For the reasons stated in this and Appellants' Opening
Brief, the Judgment of the Trial Court should be reversed
dismissing, no cause of action the Bank's claims against the
Limited Partners.

The Trial Court's determination that the

Guaranty Agreements were unenforceable should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this /<??£— day of May, 1989.

fc
Harold A. Hintze
Attorney for Defendants
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